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Abstract. Thanks to their performance and flexibility, FPGAs are in-
creasingly adopted for hardware acceleration on various platforms such
as system on chip and cloud datacenters. Their use for commercial and
industrial purposes raises concern about potential hardware security
threats. By getting access to the FPGA fabric, an attacker could im-
plement malicious logic to perform remote hardware attacks. Recently,
several papers demonstrated that FPGA can be used to eavesdrop or
disturb the activity of resources located within and outside the chip. In
a complex SoC that contains a processor and a FPGA within the same
die, we experimentally demonstrate that FPGA-based voltage sensors
can eavesdrop computations running on the CPU and that advanced
side-channel attacks can be conducted remotely to retrieve the secret
key of a symmetric crypto-algorithm.
Keywords: SoC, remote attacks, FPGA, time-to-digital converter, volt-
age sensing, side-channel attacks.
1 Introduction
Traditionally, hardware attacks are conducted in specialized laboratory using
specific heavy and expensive equipment such as oscilloscopes, probes and lasers.
For these reasons, they are considered as local attacks which require direct access
to the target for the attacker. Nowadays, getting a physical access to a target
seems trivial, but not necessarily in the future. The multiplication of cloud ser-
vices, the decentralization of computing resources and the proliferation of con-
nected devices will progressively isolate the physical device from the user and
bring a distance between the potential attacker and the victim device. Lately, the
challenge behind these new constraints associated with the ever-growing com-
plexity of system-on-chips (SoC) gave rise to a new kind of hardware attacks.
Remote hardware attacks leverage hardware vulnerabilities of distant tar-
gets to perform fault attack injection or side-channel analysis. Also known as
software induced hardware attacks, they take advantage of several weaknesses
such as the combination of software & hardware reconfiguration on critical
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resources (Clkscrew [1]), the vulnerabilities of peripherals such as memories
(Rowhammer [2]) or the micro-architectural CPU optimizations (Spectre &
Meltdown [3, 4] and more recently Foreshadow [5]). The trend around remote
attacks relies on three main points: feasibility, robustness and scalability.
Firstly, contrary to traditional hardware attacks, no expensive or specific equip-
ment is required and a simple network connection with the target can be enough
to perform the attack. Secondly, these attacks take advantage of hardware re-
sources that are inherent to the target chip. This means that the vulnerability
cannot be completely fixed or patched without redesigning the entire hardware
resource, involving at least years of development. Finally, another asset of the
remote hardware attack is its ability to be scaled up and launched on billions of
connected devices simultaneously.
This work focuses on FPGA and its recent adoption in SoCs and cloud
datacenters [6, 7]. The presence of FPGA within connected devices and also in
the cloud raises concerns about the potential associated security threats. Indeed,
the FPGA provides enough flexibility and performance to replicate a complete
hardware attack bench. Through the access to reconfigurable logic, an attacker
can implement sensors to eavesdrop side-channel leakage induced by surrounding
logic blocks and infer secret keys [8]. Glitch injectors can also be instantiated
within the fabric to disturb surrounding computations [9]. The implementation
of multi-user cloud FPGA was discussed in [10] and could act as a huge secu-
rity backdoor if a malicious tenant starts to eavesdrop or disturb other users
computations. Denial-of-service, bitstream decryption fault attack [11], crypto-
algorithms side-channel [8] are some examples of threats. This paper focuses on a
specific application of FGPA-based side-channel attacks. Using a heterogeneous
SoC that consists in a FPGA and a CPU implemented on the same die, we carry
on the work started by [12] which consists in eavesdropping CPU computation
using FPGA-based voltage sensors. Our contributions are detailed below:
− The in-depth study and improvement of FPGA-based voltage sensors per-
formances for side-channel purpose.
− The first FPGA-based side-channel attack conducted on symmetric crypto-
algorithms running on the CPU core of a SoC: Tiny AES + OpenSSL AES.
− The evaluation and comparison of FPGA-based sensors with a traditional
electromagnetic side-channel setup.
This paper presents an FPGA-based side-channel attack on a SoC CPU core.
An iterative work is conducted from the reproduction of the actual state-of-
the-art through the attack of a hardware AES to the first successful attack of
a software AES. Section 2 provides the background about FPGA side-channel
and the adopted threat model. Section 3 describes the global side-channel setup.
Section 4 and 5 are dedicated to the side-channel experiments conducted both on
hardware and software AES. Then, section 6 provides EM side-channel results
conducted on the same targets for comparison purpose and discuss feasibility
and countermeasures of FPGA-based side-channel attacks. Finally, Section 7
concludes this work.
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2 Background
2.1 Power Side-channel Attacks
Power side-channel attacks make use of the transistors switching activity leakage
through voltage variations to collect information about the processes running
inside a target device. Thanks to a correlation between the leakage and the data
processed, a side-channel attack can be performed to retrieve cryptographic keys
and secrets from a target without tampering it. By analysing power traces, an
attacker can visually speculate on the different instructions performed by the
device using Simple Power Analysis (SPA [13]). Advanced side-channel methods
such as differential power analysis (DPA [14]) or correlation power analysis (CPA
[15]) allow an attacker to infer the secret keys of cryptographic processes by
correlating guessed leakage hypotheses with a set of experimental traces.
2.2 FPGA-based voltage sensors
On-chip voltage fluctuations can be measured externally with an oscilloscope
by connecting a shunt resistor to the power supply pads. Sometimes, though,
they need to be measured internally by the chip itself to ensure good operating
conditions or detect fault attacks. Analog solutions such as Analog-to-digital
converters (ADC) can be used to directly measure internal voltage fluctuations.
However, for the sake of area economy and cost saving, on-chip sensing solutions
are generally based on digital circuits easier to implement and accurate enough to
detect fine-grained voltage fluctuations. These sensors monitor propagation delay
which is the time required for a signal to propagate through a logic gate [16].
This delay fluctuates with the power supply level and can be digitally estimated.
Ring-oscillator based sensors [17] and Time-digital converters (TDC) [18] are the
two major solutions adopted for low-cost delay monitoring. Moreover, they can
easily be implemented within a FPGA fabric using available logic.
2.3 Threat Model
Our threat model addresses all the connected devices that incorporate hardware
acceleration based on FPGA logic: from reconfigurable resources in cloud data
centers to SoCs deployed for industrial and commercial purposes. In this con-
text, we consider the potential implementation of malicious FPGA-based voltage
sensors through cloud FPGA rental, untrusted IP insertion or access to the bit-
stream reconfiguration of unsecured chips. Using these sensors, an attacker could
eavesdrop side-channel leakage induced by surrounding computations. In a cloud
scenario, a malicious user could target the side-channel leakage of cryptographic
computations conducted by other users. In SoC context, these sensors can be im-
plemented to eavesdrop the side-channel leakage induced by the SoC surrounding
logic blocks such as CPU cores or secure elements. The following work targets
heterogeneous SoCs that provide both CPU and FPGA logic blocks within the
same die. Our goal is to assess the feasibility of FPGA-based side-channel attacks
on software crypto-algorithms running within the SoC CPU.
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Fig. 1. Overview of FPGA-based Power Side-Channel Exploits
2.4 Related Works
Several works studying these threats were previously conducted. Although being
all based on FPGA sensors they introduce three different scenarios as illustrated
in figure 1.
1) Intra-FPGA Attack: Remote side-channel attacks on FPGAs were
introduced in 2018 [8]. The adversary model consists in a FPGA fabric shared
among multiple users. Each user is protected from the others by logical isola-
tion. Despite this protection, a malicious user can implement voltage sensors in
his rented logic to monitor voltage fluctuations induced by surrounding compu-
tations. Assuming this model, the adversary is able to perform a CPA attack
against a victim AES hardware module. A second exploit uses RO-based sensors
to perform intra-chip SPA against a RSA hardware module [12].
2) Inter-Chip Attack: The Inter-Chip Side-channel Attack illustrated in
figure 1.b goes a step further by proving that an untrusted chip on a PCB can
sense voltage variations induced by other chips through the power distribution
network. In this exploit, an adversary FPGA is able to perform a CPA attack
against an AES module and a SPA attack against a RSA module running on
another FPGA fabric [19].
3) Heterogeneous Chip Attack: Xilinx Zynq technology integrates a
dual core ARM processor and a FPGA fabric within the same SoC. In [12],
malicious ROs were implemented in the FPGA fabric to perform a SPA against
a naive square and multiply RSA algorithm running on a linux OS inside the
ARM CPU core as shown in figure 1.c.
3 Presentation of the Side-Channel Setup
3.1 Side-Channel Sensors
TDC-based sensor converts propagation delay variations induced by power sup-
ply fluctuations into digital information. Thanks to a low-cost design and a
fine-grained resolution it is commonly adopted as on-chip temperature or volt-
age sensor: for operating control of the chip [20] as well as glitch attack detec-
tion [21]. More recently, with the rise of FPGA cloud services, some researchers
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Fig. 2. Functional schematic of a TDC-based sensor. The Hamming Weight of the
delay line provides an image of the actual on-chip voltage level.
started to use it to perform power side-channel attacks [8, 19]. As it offers the
best trade-off between achievable resolution, accuracy and sampling frequency
[18, 21], TDC is adopted for the experiments. As illustrated in figure 2, the TDC
contains three main logic blocks:
− An init delay block whose propagation delay depends of the chip internal
voltage.
− A delay line made of n elementary delay elements (with an individual prop-
agation delay t) that allows fine measurement of propagation delay fluctua-
tions.
− A register that captures and stores the delay line state.
A clock signal, denoted clk, is connected to the TDC init delay block input
and delayed to form a δclk signal. The phase shift between clk and δclk signals
fluctuates with the voltage variations. The init delay is calibrated in order to
have the δclk edge inside the delay line when its state is captured by the TDC
register. Then, the Hamming Weight of the stored value is computed and deliv-
ers an image of the actual voltage level inside the chip (as a thermometer code).
Figure 2 illustrates the impact of voltage fluctuations on the sampled value. A
voltage rise reduces the propagation delay of the init block. Therefore, the δclk
rising edge travels faster and manages to pass more elements in the delay line.
Therefore, more “1” are sampled and the Hamming Weight of the TDC regis-
ter increases. A voltage drop induces the opposite behaviour by increasing the
propagation delay and thus, the number of “0”. To enable fine-grained voltage
sensing, the propagation delay t of the logic primitives constituting the chain
needs to be as small as possible. However, a small propagation delay involves a
long delay line to avoid saturation of the TDC. Therefore, there is a trade-off
between quantum resolution, voltage range and area consumption. We based our
experiments on an existing version of the TDC based on FPGA resources [18].
Figure 10 in appendix illustrates the schematic view of the TDC-based sensor
instance designed for the experiments.
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Fig. 3. Xilinx Zynq experimental side-channel setup
3.2 Side-Channel Targets
Previous work concerned with attacks on software used simple, self-written pub-
lic key algorithms [12]. We propose to go a step further, by proving that freely-
available (and actually deployed) symmetric crypto-algorithms are also vulnera-
ble to FPGA-based side-channel attacks. By taking advantage of the high accu-
racy and performances provided by the TDC, we aim to conduct CPA attacks
against AES software implementations.
This work targets one hardware AES and two software AES implementa-
tions. Each one of them implements distinct characteristics and enriches the
global study. The first experiment targets a hardware AES module implemented
within the FPGA fabric. The aim of this attack is the evaluation of the intrinsic
device leakage and the optimization and calibration of our sensors (note that
this attack was already conducted by [8]). The second and third experiments are
conducted on Tiny AES [22] (8-bit data-path) and OpenSSL AES [23] (32-bit
data-path). Experiments 2 and 3 represent the novelty of this publication.
3.3 Xilinx Zynq Experimental Setup
The entire side-channel setup is based on a Xilinx Zynq 7000 heterogeneous SoC
that implements both FPGA (Xilinx Artix-7) and CPU (ARM Cortex-A9) on
the same die. Figure 3 represents our experimental setup which is organized as
follows: the Artix-7 FPGA fabric embeds 8 TDC-based sensors set to provide
a sampling rate of 200 MS/s per sensor and all the logic required to store the
acquired data (FIFOs). The use of several TDCs increases the voltage fluctuation
coverage area and the granularity of the overall side-channel setup. However,
TDCs multiplication is limited by the voltage noise resulting from their own
activity. 8 TDCs is the best trade-off found for our experiments.
The fabric also integrates a custom hardware AES-128 module implemented
for experiment purposes. The dual-core Cortex-A9 CPU is cadenced at 667 MHz
and runs a bare-metal C program that implements both Tiny and OpenSSL AES.
From the attacker point of view, the side-channel traces are exported through
UART for upcoming CPA computations. (Note that in a practical scenario, CPA
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computation could be launched directly inside the target to reduce the amount of
exported data).
4 FPGA-based attack on Hardware AES
An hardware AES module is instantiated within the FPGA fabric as a prelim-
inary test for our sensors. The attacked module has a 128-bit size for both the
message and the key and encrypts data in 10 clock cycles (+ 1 additional cycle for
the export). Figure 4 illustrates the hardware AES power consumption measured
using the 8 TDCs of our test setup (their output values are added and averaged).
Side-Channel Attack: Each round transformation of the AES module ends
up with the updating of a 128-bit register that temporarily stores the round
state. The synchronous update of 128 flip-flops induces a strong leakage clearly
visible in figure 4. The CPA selection function is taken as the Hamming Distance
between the 9th and 10th round register values and a 8-bit assumption is made
on the last round key (last round attack [24]). Because the data-path is 128-bit
wide, the prediction suffers a 120-bit noise that might yield errors. 10,000 AES
leakage traces are acquired using TDCs and a CPA side-channel attack is con-
ducted. The usage of large set of traces progressively extracts the leakage out
of the noise variance. After 4,483 traces on average, the right guess shows up.
Despite the attack success, the number of traces required to retrieve the AES
secret key can be significantly reduced through the calibration of the TDCs.
Two side-channel setup optimizations are presented in the following paragraphs,
their effect on CPA results is illustrated in table 1.
Placement optimization: The impact of the sensor distance from the target
was already discussed in [8]. We implement it here as a preliminary side-channel
optimization. Close and far setups are instantiated as depicted in figure 5. In
the far setup (used for the previous attack), the TDCs are 80 slices distant from
the AES, while in the close setup, the logical distance between them is 6 slices.
The noise induced by the logic placed between the AES and the sensors
Fig. 4. Averaged power supply fluctuation resulting from 100 hardware AES encryp-
tions. AES frequency: 10 MHz - TDCs sampling rate: 200 MS/s.
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Fig. 5. Logical distance between sensors and target algorithm.
alters the valuable side-channel leakage. Reducing the distance between the sen-
sors and the target should improve the CPA results. As illustrated in table 1, by
adopting the close setup, the number of traces required to perform the attack
drops from 4,483 to 3,440.
Init delay optimization: Init delay of the TDC represented in figure 2 (and
more specifically in figure 10 in appendix) can be dynamically configured using
coarse and fine tuning. The attacker programs the dedicated logic (MUX) to
modify the number of logic elements forming the path, and consequently the
delay duration. The δclk edge propagation speed gets impacted by all the voltage
fluctuation that occurs as it travels through the init delay, yielding thereby
an averaging effect. This effect naturally smooths the sampled values and thus
acts as a high-frequency noise filter. However, depending on its duration, it can
deteriorate the accuracy of the sensor.
Through the implementation of 4 delay paths having different lengths, we
are looking forward to finding the best averaging trade-off for our device. The
init delay is increased of a half clk period per path. In practical terms, the
init path size (logic elements) is progressively increased until the propagation of
the δclk edge fills a half of the delay line with “1”. When it is the case, a half
clk period of delay has been added. This operation is repeated 1, 2 or 3 times
depending on the chosen delay duration.
Experimentally, the side-channel attack results are progressively enhanced
with the init delay path size, until it reaches 1.5 times the clk period. Then, it
finally decreases for the last setup. As highlighted in table 1, CPA results are
significantly improved by the init calibration, the number of traces required to
TDC Calibration Average number of Traces Optimization Factor
No 4,483 /
Placement 3,440 1,30
Init + Placement 1,381 3,25
Table 1. TDC optimizations and their impact on the number of traces required to
infer an AES key byte (averaged on its 16 bytes).
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infer the secret key drops from 3,440 to 1,381 traces. Altogether, placement and
init delay calibration divides by 3,25 the number of traces required to infer the
AES secret key. This optimization is substantial for the following attacks that
require a significantly larger number of side-channel traces.
5 FPGA-based attack on Software AES
In this section, side-channel attacks are conducted against freely available AES
software implementations. The optimal setup for the attacks relies on 8 TDCs
placed vertically along the left border of the fabric. According to the Zynq im-
plemented design, this placement makes sense as it bring TDCs closer to the
processing system (i.e CPU). While this paper focuses on the CPU side-channel
attack feasibility, the identification of the best TDC positions and shapes need
to be further investigated in future works.
5.1 Experiment 1 : 8-bit Tiny AES
The first target adopted for CPU experiments is the Tiny AES implementation
available on github [22]. This small 8-bit data path AES computes each AES
subfunction sequentially and processes data from the less to the most significant
byte. Our experiment focuses on the AES-128 encryption, plaintexts are ran-
domly generated and collected through UART. To make sure that the AES runs
at the CPU max frequency (667 MHz), we measured the number of clock cycles
elapsed during the encryption using ARM performance counters: around 26,000
clock cycles are required (39 µs). Figure 6 illustrates a full Tiny AES encryption
acquired using TDCs at a sampling rate of 200 MS/s. The first 9 rounds of the
AES can be easily distinguished thanks to the variation of power consumption
between 8-bit AES subfunctions ByteSub, ShiftRow and AddRoundKey and the
32-bit MixColumn subfunction. The last AES round differs from the others as
it doesn’t use the MixColumn subfunction.
Fig. 6. Averaged power supply fluctuation resulting from 100 Tiny AES encryptions.
TDC sampling rate is 200 MS/s per sensor.
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Side-Channel Attack: The side-channel leakage resulting from 8-bit AES compu-
tations has a low impact on the overall chip voltage fluctuations. The encryption
measurement only covers 5 TDC quantization levels amongst the 32 possible and
is thus more vulnerable to the low-frequency noise induced by the surrounding
peripherals (eg: voltage regulator module 500 KHz) and physical effects (eg: tem-
perature variations). To enhance the signal-to-noise ratio and reduce the number
of traces required for the attack, we need to apply high-pass filtering on each
side-channel trace. After preliminary filtering, the CPA can be conducted. The
selection function chosen for the CPA is the standard Hamming Weight model
of the first round ByteSub output: HW [Sbox[k ⊕m]]. The attack is a success,
an average of 111,000 traces are required to infer a secret AES key byte. Despite
a significant increase of the number of traces required for the attack, TDCs are
still accurate enough to perform CPA against software algorithms running on
our target. The side-channel performance deterioration can be explained by the
greater logical distance between the FPGA-based sensors and the CPU logic and
the sensibility limitation of the TDC-based sensors.
5.2 Experiment 2 : 32-bit OpenSSL AES
The OpenSSL library [23] implements a wide range of cryptographic algorithms
massively used for secure channels over computer networks. In this work, we
focus on the OpenSSL AES-128 that implements a 32-bit tabulated version of
the AES [25]. This variant merges Mixcolumn and ByteSub subfunctions into
4 look-ups tables known as T-tables (256 x 32-bit). The round transformation
of each input byte is directly loaded from the T-tables and thus speeds up the
computation. OpenSSL cadenced at 667 MHz encrypts 128-bit of data in 2,9
µs - 13.5 faster than the Tiny AES. Figure 7 illustrates the power consumption
induced by OpenSSL AES encryption.
OPENSSL1: 8-bit selection function. The first round model HW [Sbox[k ⊕m]]
previously used for the Tiny AES attack works fairly well even against OpenSSL
Fig. 7. Averaged power supply fluctuation resulting from 100 OpenSSL AES encryp-
tions. TDC sampling rate is 200 MS/s per sensor.
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Fig. 8. Correlation rate over the time obtained for the good guess of each OpenSSL
key byte. The 32-bit implementation can be recognized by observing the byte order.
(Each color represent a 32-bit word)
tabulated AES. According to the definition of the 4 T-tables described in [25],
each table output consists in a 32-bit word T [ki⊕mi] in which the natural Sbox
value relative to the input byte ki ⊕mi has been multiplied by the MixColumn
coefficients. For each table the natural 8-bit value of the Sbox appears twice in
the word because two of the Mixcolumn coefficients equal one. Therefore, 16-bit
of the 32-bit output word will leak according to the Sbox model. Using such a
selection function, 130,000 traces are necessary for the attack to succeed.
OPENSSL2: 32-bit selection function. The first round model can be used to
perform reverse engineering. Contrary to classic 8-bit AES which computes each
AES byte from the less significant byte to the most significant, tabulated 32-bit
AES computes each key byte according to the ShiftRow order. This order can
be perceived in temporal CPA results. Figure 8 illustrates the timing correlation
obtained for each right guess of the 16 AES key bytes. The byte order follows
the ShiftRow order and betrays the presence of a tabulated AES. Thanks to this
information, an attacker can slightly improve the CPA model by making a full
32-bit prediction. Instead of targeting the Hamming Weight of the Sbox output,
the attacker adds the T-table in his selection function: HW [Tt(k ⊕ m)]. The
expected benefit is a slightly better correlation and a quicker hypotheses distin-
guishing. Experimentally, the average number of traces required to perform the
attack drops to 87,000 which is 1.5 time less than the Sbox model.
This section experimentally demonstrates that FPGA-based sensors are
suitable for side-channel attacks against software symmetrical algorithms. Ac-
cording to the selection function adopted for the experiments the number of
traces required to infer the secret key fluctuates from 87,000 to 127,000. No
significant distinction exists between the 8-bit Tiny AES and 32-bit OpenSSL
AES attacks as they both leaks accordingly to the Sbox model. The attack of
side-channel resistant crypto-algorithms could be considered in future works to
further evaluate the potential and limitations of FPGA-based sensors.
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Fig. 9. On the left, a XRAY picture of the Zynq BGA package, the die is contained
within the rectangle. On the right, the side-channel setup based on a langer EM probe.
6 EM Results & Discussion
To evaluate the pertinence of side-channel analysis that can be performed re-
motely by our TDC sensors, we challenge these results regarding classical local
side-channel attacks. This section presents a performance comparison with a
traditional EM side-channel setup and discusses about FPGA-based attacks fea-
sibility and associated countermeasures.
6.1 Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attack
Figure 9.b illustrates the EM setup that consists in a Langer near field micro-
probe connected to an oscilloscope with a 5 GS/s sampling rate and a 12-bit
resolution. The probe position can be controlled using a X,Y,Z table. The signal
is first amplified by a low noise amplifier (LNA), then connected to the oscillo-
scope. A XRAY picture of the ZYNQ7000 depicted in figure 9.a was taken to
check the die structure. Two hot-spots are represented, the first one offers the
best contrast and visualisation of the hardware AES side-channel leakage, while
the second one gives the best results for software AES algorithms. The electro-
magnetic leakage of the first round of each attacked AES is leveraged to trigger
the oscilloscope. The captured samples are then extracted and used to perform
a correlation electromagnetic analysis (CEMA).
CEMA is conducted against each AES studied in this work. Table 2 gathers
all the results obtained with both TDCs and EM setups. Although these setups
are not based on the same physical effect, it makes sense to compare FPGA-based
sensors performance. According to table 2, the hardware AES and OpenSSL
AES attacks based on TDCs require roughly as many side-channel traces than
Setup HAES Tiny AES OpenSSL 1 OpenSSL 2
EM 1,021 52,438 106,225 88,412
TDC 1,381 111,758 127,558 87,422
Table 2. Averaged number of traces required to retrieve a key byte on various AES
implementations for EM and TDC side-channel setups
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EM. This means that with only 32 quantization levels and a 200 MS/s sampling
rate, TDCs provide similar results to a high performance oscilloscope. Naturally,
this must be interpreted with caution as TDCs were previously calibrated and
optimized for this specific device and attack scenario. Moreover, a significant
difference between EM and TDCs still appears when it comes to the Tiny AES
attack. As mentioned before, this has to do with the surrounding noise and the
sensibility limitation of the TDCs.
This experiment aimed to demonstrate that through the calibration and
optimization of our sensors, we are able to provide similar results to traditional
side-channel setups. Finally, this further proves the extent of the remote hard-
ware attack threat.
6.2 Attack feasibility
The feasibility of FPGA-based attack on a practical scenario substantially relies
on the security level provided by the target. Three major requirements need to
be met to make it possible:
1) Medium: The side-channel attacks conducted in this paper require the
implementation of voltage sensors within a victim FPGA fabric. This can be
done in cloud datacenters through the rental of reconfigurable logic, by the
insertion of malicious trojan within untrusted FPGA IPs or through the direct
reconfiguration of unsecured FPGA chips.
2) Data knowledge: Side-channel attacks conducted against secret key
algorithms such as AES require the knowledge of victim plaintexts or ciphertexts.
Depending on the use case, accessing this information can be challenging for the
attacker especially because each trace acquired using TDCs must match with
the exact plain/cipher text used for the encryption. The feasibility is related
to the opportunity for the attacker to trigger victim encryption and to retrieve
plain or cipher texts.
3) Synchronisation: Victim side-channel leakage needs to be dynamically
detected by the sensor logic to facilitate the attack. A trigger mechanism can
be implemented within the TDC to start the data storage when a large voltage
undershoot occurs. However, this trigger mechanism cannot be fully reliable and
sometimes get disturbed by surrounding noise induced by temperature variations
or peripherals computations. Depending on the overall noise level, the attack
complexity can soar. To facilitate the attack, a local clone of the targeted device
can be used to adjust and calibrate the side-channel setup towards the actual
remote exploit.
6.3 Countermeasures
The threat behind FPGA-based hardware attack has already been taken into
account by cloud providers who assure that, for the sake of security and integrity,
their FPGA resources are not shared between multiple users. However, although
this protection mitigates intra-FPGA attacks, FPGA sensors can still eavesdrop
computations that occur in other chips connected to the same power supply
even in presence of decoupling capacitors [19]. To mitigate the threat once for
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all, an independent power supply should then be provided for each FPGA chip.
Protecting SoCs that implement both FPGA and CPU within the same die
should be more complex. The dissociation of the power sources would require
the creation of two independent power distribution networks and thus increase
the overall design cost. Designers should be aware of the side-channel threat
and should consider it even when the device is not physically accessible by the
attacker. An efficient way to prevent a crypto-algorithm from being remotely
attacked is the usage of the usual side-channel countermeasures as for instance
shuﬄing, masking, random delays or jitter.
7 Conclusion
With the massive adoption of FPGA hardware acceleration in connected systems
such as SoC and cloud data centers, the eventuality of remote FPGA-based hard-
ware attacks become more and more realistic. In this work, we demonstrated that
FPGA logic instantiated within a complex SoC can be leveraged to monitor volt-
age fluctuations of the surrounding logic blocks and in particular that of a CPU.
We conducted three experiments from the side-channel attack of a hardware AES
instantiated within the FPGA logic to the attack of two software AES running
on the CPU core. The first experiment was carried out on the hardware AES
module. It allowed us to calibrate several parameters to improve side-channel
results (init delay, position, filtering, etc.). Then we performed the first FPGA-
based side-channel attacks on software AES (Tiny AES and OpenSSL AES).
The side-channel leakage induced by CPU core being much weaker, the attack
required a substantial increase of the number of side-channel to infer the encryp-
tion key. To evaluate the performances of our sensors, we conducted the same
attack using a EM traditional setup and obtained comparable results to those
achieved with TDC-based sensors. This attests the extend of the threat that
unsecured FPGA SoC constitute. Finally, care must be taken when designing
SoC to ensure that hardware resources cannot be maliciously used as hardware
attack means.
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8 Appendix
Fig. 10. Logic schematic and implemented design of one TDC-based sensor instance.
Each dotted rectangle in the logic schematic represents 1 slice (26 in total). The delay
line provides 32 quantization levels and a sampling rate of 200 MS/s per sensor.
